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Brown: Torts
TORTS
I.

PHYSICAL HAMS

A. Charitable Immunity
Decker v. Bishop of Charleston' involved an action brought
for physical injuries sustained in a church owned by the defendant as corporation sole. The plaintiff conceded that in accordance with prior decisions 2 the Bishop, as a true charity, would
have immunity from tort liability. He sought recovery, however, on the basis that (1) abandonment of the doctrine by many
courts has evolved a new trend; (2) the doctrine was originated
by judicial decision and therefore should be overruled by the
judiciary; and (3) an exception to the general rule should be
allowed to the extent of the defendant's liability insurance.
Finding a great deal of continued adherence in other jurisdictions to the charitable immunity doctrine, the supreme court
reaffirmed its past decisions, citing Rogers v. Florence Printing (o.: 3
It is often the function of the courts by their judgments to
establish public policy where none on the subject exists.
Once firmly rooted, such policy becomes in effect a rule of
conduct or of property within the state. In the exercise of
proper judicial self-restraint, the courts should leave it to
the people, through their elected representatives in the General Assembly to say whether or not it should be revised or
4
discarded.
The court also held that procurement of liability insurance by
a charitable organization did not create tort liability when the
organization otherwise would be immune. In the absence of a
South Carolina decision in point, the holding was based on the
similar holdings in other jurisdictions. 5
1. 247 S.C. 317, 147 S.E.2d 264 (1966).
2. In Lindler v. Columbia Hosp., 98 S.C. 25, 81 S.E. 512 (1914), the

court said that it would be against public policy to hold a charitable institu-

tion responsible for the negligence of its servants, selected with due care.
Accord, Caughman v. Columbia YMCA, 212 S.C. 337, 47 S.E2d 788 (1948) ;
Vermillion v. Woman's College of Due West, 104 S.C. 197, 88 S.E. 649 (1916).

3. 233 S.C. 567, 106 S.E.2d 258 (1958).
4. 247 S.C. 317, 325, 147 S.E.2d 264, 268 (1966).
5. See, e.g., Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 139 (1952). The court also recognized as

persuasive authority: Maxey v. Sauls, 242 S.C. 247, 130 S.E.2d 570 (1963)
(Unemancipated child had no right of tort action against parent though the
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B. Procedure
While operating a bus for a North Carolina corporation,
Lonnie Downing was killed in a head-on collision with an automobile in South Carolina. In Downing v. Ulmer,O a wrongful
death action was successfully maintained in the district court.
As a result of this judgment and pursuant to North Carolina
law, 7 Downing's employer and its insurance carrier petitioned
the court for recovery of workmen's compensation paid to
dependents of the deceased employee. Since plaintiff did not
contest the issue, disbursement was made in accordance with the
claim, but the court warned:
Regardless of the manner in which such subrogation right
or lien may be protected under North Carolina's procedure,
the mode, time and manner in which employer and compensation insurer might assert in actions pending in this court
its substantive right of subrogation against the defendant
as a third party tort-feasor is a procedural matter to be
determined by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
not by the local law of North Carolina.8
It was recognized, however, that the petitioners had such an
interest in the subject matter of the litigation, that had they
made a timely application to the court, under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 9 they could have intervened as a party
plaintiff.
C. Causation
In Conyers v. Stewart10 an action was brought for personalinjuries sustained while riding as a passenger in defendant's
automobile. Prior to the midday accident the automobile had
been proceeding at a moderate speed along an undesignated
country road bordered by woodlands and cultivated fields. As
the parties approached the scene of the accident, they could see
a farm tractor approximately 1,200 feet ahead, parked on the
parent had liability insurance); and McKenzie v. City of Florence, 234 S.C.
428, 108 S.E.2d 825 (1959) (Municipality did not wave its sovereign immunity by procuring a surety bond for its police department).

6. 253 F. Supp. 694 (D.S.C. 1966).
7. N.C. GEiq. STAT. § 97-10.2 (1965).
8. 253 F. Supp. 694, 698 n.2 (D.S.C. 1966).
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
10. 247 S.C. 403, 147 S.E.2d 640 (1966).
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left side of the road and facing in the same direction they were
traveling. Without changing speed or sounding her horn, the
defendant attempted to pass to the right of the tractor. At that
moment the tractor suddenly started a right turn into the roadway and thereby collided with the automobile. The circuit court
directed a verdict in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the
supreme court, in viewing the facts most favorable to plaintiff,
considered that the tractor driver was likely to have been unaware of a traffic hazard and that the defendant failed to give
the warning required by statute.' It held that the evidence was
sufficient to raise a jury issue as to causative negligence of the
defendant.' 2
D. Joint Tort-feasors
The declaratory judgment action in Vance Trucking Co. v.
Canal Ins. Co.13 arose when a truck crossed to the wrong side of
the road and collided head-on with an automobile. The plaintiff
had leased the truck and driver from the defendant Forrester
Trucking Company. It was the contention of both parties and
their insurers that the driver had acted as agent of the other at
the time of the accident. After an examination of the surrounding circumstances,' 4 the court found that by a common relationship the parties had utilized the truck and driver during the
lease period so as to maximize the economic benefits for both.
Basing liability upon the control of the agent's acts, 15 the court
held that the driver had acted as agent for both parties. 16
Consequently, they were compelled to defend a pending wrongful death action as joint tort-feasors.
11. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-581 to -82 (1962).
12. In the circuit court the defendant did not rely upon the guest statute,
S.C. CoDE ANN. § 46-801 (1962). Consequently the supreme court made no
review of the circuit court's holding that the plaintiff was not a guest within

the meaning of the statute.
13. 249 F. Supp. 33 (D.S.C. 1966).
14. Relying on Tate v. Claussen-Lawrence Constr. Co., 168 S.C. 481, 167
S.E. 826 (1933), the court said that in resolving this factual situation, consideration must be given to the continuing relationship as well as to the
written lease. See also Hutson v. Herndon, 243 S.C. 257, 133 S.E2d 753

(1963).

15. See Edwards v. Rogers, 120 F. Supp. 499 (E.D.S.C. 1954); Hutson v.

Herndon, supra note 14; Brownlee v. Charleston Motor Express Co., 189
S.C. 204, 200 S.E. 819 (1939).

16. See, e.g., Jackson v. Blue, 152 F2d 67 (4th Cir. 1945); Siidekum v.

Animal Rescue League, 353 Pa. 408, 45 A.2d 59 (1946).
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E. Duty of Care
In Humphries v. McCrory-McLellan Stores Corp.17 the
plaintiff fell when she caught the spiked heel of her shoe in a
hole at the entrance of the defendant's store. The hole, which
was described as "round, no more than a penny's width across,"
was for the purpose of receiving a bolt from the door when it
was lowered into a locking position. Recognizing the general
rule in South Carolina,' 8 which requires that storekeepers exercise ordinary care toward their customers, the court vacated the
plaintiff's jury award and dismissed the cause of action. It
stated:
[The hole's] design and installation were specified by the
building's architects many years before the plaintiff's mishap. It is too small to appear dangerous....
Moreover, the plaintiff's heel was over three inches in
height, with a slim shaft tapering to a base hardly a halfinch in diameter. A seamless or unbroken step or floor
surface would be necessary to assure the wearer entire
security. Common experience and observation teach how
impracticable and unreasonable it would be to insist upon
such exactness in providing ingress and egress into and
from business premises. The obligation of ordinary care
19
does not require it.
The case is interesting because a dissenting judge felt that the
ultimate question should not have been converted from one of
fact to one of law. 20 lie asserted that the store owner knew or
should have known of the changes in prescribed feminine fashion and therefore was required to exercise reasonable care in
protecting against special hazards.
McGee v. Colonial Pipelie Co.,-" involving an action brought
for property damage, was decided only with respect to the
17. 358 F2d 901 (4th Cir. 1966).
18. A storekeeper is under a duty to use ordinary care in maintaining exits,
adits and public spaces of his premises in a reasonably safe condition for the
use of his customers, but he does not insure their safety. See Baker v. Clark,
233 S.C. 20, 103 S.E.2d 395 (1958); Hunter v. Dixie Home Stores, 232 S.C.
139, 101 S.E.2d 262 (1957). He is also under a duty to warn of hidden danger
or unsafe conditions of which he knows or in the exercise of reasonable supervision or inspection should know. See Baker v. Clark, mepra; Bolen v.
Strange, 192 S.C. 284, 6 S.E.2d 466 (1939).
19. Humphries v. McCrory-McLellan Stores Corp., 358 F.2d 901, 902 (4th
Cir. 1966).
20. Id. at 902 (dissenting opinion).
21. 247 S.C. 413, 147 S.E.2d 645 (1966).
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defendant Hess Oil and Chemical Corporation. The action was
based on the fact that Hess allowed a highly flammable liquid
to escape from its premises into a stream which eventually
flowed near plaintiff's property and emitted a strong odor of
gasoline. In considering the question of negligence, the court
agreed that the storage, handling or other use of a potentially
dangerous product required a degree of care commensurate with
the danger, but it reversed the circuit court's judgment in favor
of plaintiff because he had failed to show damage to his
property.
The case of Kapusainsky v. United States22 was an action

brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act.23 The plaintiff,
a newborn infant in the United States Naval Hospital at
Charleston, South Carolina, was placed in a nursery for premature babies. Shortly prior to this time, Karen Kreb, an inexperienced Wave, had been assigned to work in that nursery
without any preliminary physical examination. Four days after
birth, plaintiff became critically ill and after extensive tests the
disabling illness was shown to be a result of "hospital staph."
A laboratory test run on throat cultures taken from the nursery
personnel produced Karen Kreb as a carrier of staphylococcus.
The defendant argued that its duty of care should be "measured
by the degree of care, skill and diligence customarily exercised
by hospitals generally in the community. 2 4 In this respect it
was shown that a majority of local hospitals did not require
preliminary examination of nursery personnel though knowing
full well the possible consequences that might result in the
absence of such tests. After circumventing the charitable
immunity defense 25 the court found that it was the hospital's
duty to give the plaintiff that reasonable care and attention
which her known physical and mental condition required ;26 that
as a premature baby she was entitled to the highest possible
22. 248 F. Supp. 732 (D.S.C. 1966).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1964).
24. Kapuschinsky v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 732, 743 (D.S.C. 1966) as
quoted from Garfield Memorial Hosp. v. Marsal, 204 F.2d 721, 725 (1953).
25. After establishing the hospital to be a private profit-making institution,
the court as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1964) looked to the law of
the place where the alleged negligence occurred for a determination of liability. As a result of the charitable immunities doctrine in South Carolina, there
existed no South Carolina cases directly in point, but liability was found on
the basis of general law. See, e.g., Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 1205.
26. See 26 Am. Jup. Hospitals and Asylums § 14 (1940).
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degree of care.2 7 Quoting from Dean Prosser, that "it may be
negligence... to proceed in conscious ignorance in the face of an
obvious risk," 28 the court, though applying the "community

had breached the
standard" test, concluded that the defendant
29
standard of care owed to the plaintiff.

F. Statutory Standards of Care
Burks v. Texaco, I-w.3 0 concerned a loss of plaintiff's feed

mill by fire. The defendant, who operated a storage facility
situate in the city of Anderson, spilled between 75 and 115 gallons of gasoline while transferring it from a railroad tank car to
the Texaco premises. The spilled gasoline entered a drainage
ditch on the defendant's property and through a downhill maze
of interconnected ditches was eventually discharged under plaintiff's mill. When fire broke out in one of the ditches, it spread
rapidly to the mill and consumed it. Prior to this event, the city
had enacted an ordinance 3 ' which required that separator boxes
be maintained at the intersection of all public ditches where
flammable liquids might enter. The court found the provisions
of this ordinance applicable to the situation and held that
32
Texaco was negligent per se in failing to comply with the law.
G. Res Ipsa Loquitur
During this survey period, several cases have reaffirmed the
well established rule that res ipsa loquitur does not apply in
South Carolina. The cases are noteworthy as examples of situations in which actionable negligence had to be established
without the aid of this doctrine.
In Chaney v. Burgess3 the defendant was launching a boat
when his automobile and trailer became stuck in mud adjacent
27. See St Lukes Hosp. Ass'n v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P.2d 917 (1952).
28. Kapuschinsky v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 732, 747 n.17 (D.S.C.

1966).

29. The district court, relying on the case of Bessinger v. Deloach, 230
S.C. 1, 94 S.E.2d 3 (1956) found that South Carolina courts would apply the
"community standard" test; its holding, therefore, was based on the fact that
one local hospital required the tests even though the others did not. In
justification of this position and in further observation of South Carolina law,
it commented that in South Carolina, the "community" does not seem to be
"necessarily restricted to the geographical area in proximity to the alleged
tortfeasor, but would extend to other locales similarly situated." Kapuschinsky
v. United States, 248 F. Supp. 732, 743-4 (D.S.C. 1966).
30. 361 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1965).
31. ANDERsoN, S.C., CoDE § 15A06d (1955).
32. Accord, Lindler v. Southern Ry., 84 S.C. 536, 66 S.E. 995 (1910).
33. 246 S.C. 261, 143 S.E.2d 521 (1965).
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to a lake. Upon being asked for assistance, the plaintiff gratuitously volunteered the use of his tractor and services. While
he braked the tractor, the defendant looped a chain around the
tractor hitch and secured both ends to the trailer in such a
manner that pull would result in a vertical and horizontal force.
On the defendant's signal, the plaintiff started the tractor forward at which time the lower chain became unfastened. The
sudden unbalanced force caused the tractor to tilt back and as
a result the plaintiff was thrown to the ground and injured. It
was held that the facts, tested in the light of common experience, made out a prima facie case that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.
Crider v. Inzfinger Transp. 0.3 4 involved an action brought
for property damages. It had its origin when the defendant's
tanker truck, containing liquid asphalt at 375 degrees, was
negligently struck by an automobile and overturned. To clear
the highway the tanker was righted as quickly as possible,
causing a large quantity of the hot asphalt to escape from the
tanker and flow onto the plaintiff's land damaging it and killing some livestock. The plaintiff's witness admitted that, considering the condition of the tanker and the asphalt, to turn the
tanker right side up was all that could be done under the circumstances. The court, in granting the defendant's motion for
a directed verdict, stated that persons using a highway must
exercise ordinary care to avoid injury to the owners of abutting
property but are not liable for injuries caused to such owners as
a consequence of a lawful and non-negligent use of the highway.36
In the cases of Kapusehinsky v. United StateS3 6 and Burris
v. Texaco, Inc.,3 7 which are considered respectively under Duty
of Care and Statutory Standards of Care, the plaintiffs recovered on the basis of circumstantial evidence. As was pointed
out, "the legal burden upon the plaintiff does not become more
onerous because the evidence is circumstantial, though the
'burden of persuasion' is necessarily more difficult."3 8
34. 248 S.C. 10, 148 S.E.2d 732 (1966).
35. See 25 Am. Jur. Highways § 224 (1940).
36. 248 F. Supp. 732 (D.S.C. 1966).
37. 361 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1965).

38. 248 F. Supp. 732, 743 (D.S.C. 1966).
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H. Contributory Negligence
The question of contributory negligence has been litigated in
a number of cases. They have held that:
Plaintiff's conduct contributed as a proximate cause when:
(1) Blinded by the morning sun under similar conditions
previously experienced, the plaintiff continued to drive her
automobile along a familiar street until she collided with
the defendant's automobile parked in violation of a city
ordinance. Edwards v. Bloom.39
(2) Driving a truck on a familiar highway, the plaintiff
attempted to pass a school bus at an intersection in violation of a passing statute40 and when the bus turned left
without signaling, a collision ensued. 41 Graingerv. Nationwide Hut. Ins. Co.42
Plaintiff's contributory negligence was a proper jury question
when:
(1) Prior to colliding with the defendant's truck, the
plaintiff, with an unobstructed view, was driving her automobile and looking ahead but failed to see the truck as it
entered the highway in violation of the yield-the-right-of44
way statute.43 Clawson 'v. City of Sumter.
(2) To avoid interference of lights from what appeared
to be the defendant's automobile approaching in the proper
lane, the driver of the plaintiff's automobile looked to the
right shoulder and as a result collided with the defendant's
automobile parked on the wrong side of the highway. Bev45
erly v. Sarvis.
(3) On a rainy night, a Negro pedestrian, who had violated a highway crossing statute,46 was struck by the de39. 246 S.C. 346, 143 S.E.2d 614 (1965).
40. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-388(2) (1962).
41. The action was brought pursuant to S.C.
(1962).

CODE

ANN. § 21-840(1) (c)

42. 247 S.C. 293, 147 S.E.2d 262 (1966).
43. S.C. CoDE

ANN.

§ 46-423 (1962).

44. 247 S.C. 499, 148 S.E.2d 350 (1966).
45. 246 S.C. 470, 144 S.E.2d 220 (1965).
46. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-435 (1962).
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fendant's automobile shortly after moving 48to the edge of
the proper shoulder.47 Johnson v. Fney.
(4) The plaintiff saw the defendant's eastbound truck
approaching on the highway some 500 to 600 feet away.
She drove her automobile from a driveway onto the highway making a left turn to the west at which time the truck
collided with her in the westbound lane. GambrelZ v. Russell Transfer Go.4 9
(5) Chased by an armed assailant, the plaintiff, a seventeen-year-old boy, was seeking help when he ran into the
street and was struck by the defendant's automobile. Young
v. Livingston."0
Plaintiff's sole negligence caused the injury when:
(1) As a paying guest, a seventy-eight-year-old woman,
who had experienced falls at home and had used the doorway of her motel room on three prior occasions, was injured
in a fall while stepping from the threshold of the room in
broad daylight to a discernable colored brick step riser
which was free from shadows and foreign matter. Wainwright v. Thomts.r1
(2) On a clear day at an unobstructed railroad crossing
with flashing red lights and automatic bells, the plaintiff
disregarded a passenger's warning and drove his automobile onto the path of an oncoming train where it stalled.
The train, which gave statutory warning but which was
slightly exceeding the municipal speed limit, struck the
automobile causing it to strike and injure the plaintiff who
had left the automobile but had chosen to remain nearby.
52
Grahan v. &eaboardAir Line R.R.
I. Oomparative Negligence
In Graham3 the railroad crossing case above, the district
court recognized that under common law principles, the plain-

47. As required by S.C.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

CODE ANN. § 46-436 (1962).
246 S.C. 366, 143 S.E.2d 722 (1965).
247 S.C. 49, 145 S.E.2d 432 (1965).
247 S.C. 385, 147 S.E.2d 624 (1966).
250 F. Supp. 963 (D.S.C. 1966).
250 F. Supp. 566 (D.S.C. 1966).
Graham v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 250 F. Supp. 566 (D.S.C. 1966).
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tiff's simple negligence would preclude recovery from a defendant guilty of a comparable degree of negligence; that likewise,
gross negligence, recklessness, willfulness and wantonness, bar
recovery when by the same "yardstick" it is established as a
defense. Accordingly, it was found that the gross negligence of
the plaintiff, as measured against the non-contributing simple
negligence of the defendant, was the proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury.
J. Imputation of Driver's Negligence to Passenger
Though the plaintiff and two other men shared equally in the
proceeds from a construction contract and as a result had a
common purpose in getting to and from the job site, it was held
in Spradley v. Houser5 4 that the negligent operation of the
automobile by one of the parties would not be imputed to the
plaintiff in an action for personal injuries sustained in a headon collision with the defendant. From Iwemnity Ins. Co. of
No. America v. Odom,55 a case involving a similar factual
situation, the court quoted that:
While there doubtless was a common purpose on the part
of all of these employees, the [plaintiff] .. .certainly had
no voice in the control of [the automobile] . . .nor did he

have an equal right with this driver to direct and govern
its movements, which is an essential requirement of the
doctrine of common enterprise. 56
Russell v. Seaboard Air Line R.R. 57 was an action brought
for the wrongful death of Eula Mae Baker who was killed on
a return trip from Myrtle Beach in her own automobile driven
by her son Winifred into the path of the defendant's train. In
reversing a jury verdict favorable to the plaintiff, the court
found as a matter of law that the negligence of the son was
imputed to his mother under the principles of respondeat
superior. A dissenting judge5" found the evidence to be susceptible of the inference
[Tihat Mrs. Baker simply entrusted the automobile to her
son Clifton... for the purpose of accomplishing his return
54. 247 S.C. 208, 146 S.E.2d 621 (1966).

55. 237 S.C. 167, 116 S.E.2d 22 (1960).
56. 247 S.C. 208, 212, 146 S.E.2d 621, 623 (1966).
57. 246 S.C. 516, 144 S.E2d 799 (1965).

58. Id. at 527, 144 S.E.2d at 804 (dissenting opinion).
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to Myrtle Beach [Air Force Base]. And that he, having
arrived at his destination, relinquished the same to his
brother for the purpose of completing the mission or purpose ...

by returning it [home]....

That Mrs. Baker, no

doubt, desired to accommodate her adult son, enjoyed his
company on the trip, and of course desired to return home,
are matters which were purely incidental to the main purpose of the trip .... ;1
In accord with the weight of general authority,60 the dissent
concluded that return of the automobile following the son's
personal use was "not a service being rendered for the owner
so as to constitute the driver the servant of the owner. The fact
that the owner may receive some incidental benefit from or in
connection with the trip does not alter the relationship." 61
K. Sudden Emergency
Grier, a passenger in the defendant's automobile, was injured
when the brakes suddenly failed and the automobile struck a
tree. In Grier v. Cornelius,62 the plaintiff-passenger sought
reversal of an unfavorable jury verdict on the basis that the
circuit court had inconsistently charged (1) the sudden emer64
gency doctrine6 3 and (2) that violation of the brake statute
was negligence per se. The brakes of the automobile had been
repaired approximately thirty days prior to the accident and
on the morning thereof, the defendant had braked several times
with no apparent difficulty. The supreme court affirmed the
66
judgment and giving the statute" a reasonable construction,
held:
We have never adopted such a strict position that would
make the owner or operator of a motor vehicle an insurer
against any and all defects in the vehicle's equipment. We
59. Id. at 529, 144 S.E.2d at 805-06 (dissenting opinion).

60. See Annot., 51 A.L.R.2d 10, 21-27 (1957).
61. 246 S.C. 516, 530, 144 S.E.2d 799, 806 (1965)
62. 247 S.C. 521, 148 S.E.2d 338 (1966).

(dissenting opinion).

63. The court noted that the trial court judge prefaced his charge by
instructing the jury "that a person who is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with a perilous situation or emergency must not have brought the
emergency about by his own negligence." Id. at 536, 148 S.E2d at 345.
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-561 (1962).
65. Ibid.
66. See also Spencer v. Kirby, 234 S.C. 59, 106 S.E2d 883 (1959).
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do not think that the Legislature intended the equipment
statute to impose liability without fault or make the owner
or operator of an automobile an absolute insurer of his
brakes. In view of our decisions, a violation of the brake
statute is negligence as a matter of law. However, the mere
failure of brakes is not a violation of the brake statute as
a matter of law.6 7
In Young v. Livingston,6 which is briefly discussed under
ContributoryNegligence and further discussed under Last Clear
Chance, the circuit court charged:
[O]n the question of contributory negligence, if you believe
from the evidence that the plaintiff was confronted with a
sudden peril not arising from his own faults, then he may
act in the manner which the emergency seems to require for
the purpose of avoiding injury to himself without being
guilty of contributory negligence, provided he acted as one
of his age and of his capacity, discretion, knowledge and
experience would ordinarily have acted under the circumstances.6 9
In rejecting the argument that the charge eliminated the defense
of contributory negligence, the supreme court said that it was
simply illustrative of the adage that "the facts make the law."
In Barton 'v. G-iffith,70 a case concerned primarily with
damages, the district court said that a motorist is not the insurer of children and though a child, under South Carolina law,
cannot be guilty of contributory negligence,' 1 when he enters
the highway suddenly and without warning of his presence, a
defendant is not necessarily guilty of actionable negligence for
striking him with his automobile.
L. Last Clear Chance
In Young v. Livingston7 2 the defendant, who was driving
south in the east lane of a one-way street, was stopped at a
traffic light. From that point he had an unobstructed view of
67. 247 S.C. 521, 530-31, 148 S.E.2d 338, 342 (1966).
68. 247 S.C. 385, 147 S.E.2d 624 (1966).

69. Id. at 392, 147 S.E.2d at 627.
70. 253 F. Supp. 774 (D.S.C. 1966).
71. See Sexton v. Noll Constr. Co., 108 S.C. 516, 95 S.E. 129 (1918).

72. 247 S.C. 385, 147 S.E.2d 624 (1966).
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the plaintiff ahead as he fled from the western curb diagonally
across the street. It was also clearly visible that as he ran, the
plaintiff was looking over his shoulder at his assailant who was
in hot pursuit. When the light changed, the defendant proceeded without altering his course or doing anything except to
apply his brakes at the last moment prior to striking plaintiff
at a point 120 feet from where he had been waiting for the light.
In dismissing the defendant's objections as being without merit,
the supreme court ruled that the facts warranted a charge by
the circuit court of the well-settled rule that:
A plaintiff who is guilty of contributory negligence may
nevertheless recover if the defendant had the last clear
chance to avoid the accident by the exercise of due care, if
he realizes, or should have realized that the plaintiff was
inattentive or unaware of the danger.7 8
M. Proximate Cause
Appealing from an adverse jury verdict, the plaintiff in
Pioneer Mfg. Co. v. Caroiin Equip. Rentals, In. 7 4 contended
that the rule of implied warranty of fitness should apply to
bailment transactions as a matter of law. The claim was predicated upon a lease agreement by which the plaintiff had leased
one of the defendant's trucks. The truck, loaded with the plaintiff's products, had departed from Camden, South Carolina, for
an Alabama destination, but while enroute in Georgia, the driver
discovered that the rear door had opened causing a large amount
of the cargo to be lost along the highway. Recognizing that
there had been no previous opportunity in South Carolina to
apply the rule of implied fitness to this type of bailment transaction, the court said:
Assuming the soundness, within certain limitations, of the
general rule of law7 5 relied upon by plaintiff, we are still
cited to no authority which supports the ultimate contention
of the plaintiff that it was entitled to judgment, as a matter
[T]he
of law, on the evidence disclosed by the record ....
most that could be said of the evidence here is that a jury
73. Id. at 391, 147 S.E.2d at 626.
74. 247 S.C. 452, 148 S.E.2d 48 (1966).
75. See 8 C.J.S. Bailinents § 25a (1962); 8 Am. JUR. 2d Bailments § 143
(1963).
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issue was presented as to whether the damages sustained by
the plaintiff were proximately caused by any breach of
such implied warranty on the part of the defendant. 76
Evidence showed that broken latch plates had allowed the door
to open, but the only evidence which tended to show that the
break was caused by a defect in the plates or by the fault of the
defendant was the testimony that "It just looked like they had
worn in two."
Tilley v. Delta Airlines, Inc.77 involved an action for personal
injury brought against the defendant United States under the
Federal Tort Claims Act.78

The plaintiff was aboard a Delta

aircraft which, under the control of a local tower employee of
the Federal Aviation Agency, was proceeding to a take-off
position on the runway. At the same time, a Sabena aircraft
continued down the runway and, as it drew dangerously near
the taxiing Delta, the controller excitedly directed the Delta
pilot to clear the runway immediately 180 degrees to the left.
To make this maneuver, the pilot applied power to his engines
causing the front wheel of the craft to leave the paved runway.
The plaintiff's back was injured in the ensuing sudden stop. It
was held that violation of the Air Traffic Control Procedure
Regulations 9 by the United States was the proximate cause of
the injury. The pilot's act, which was in accordance with the
controller's emergency instructions, was not such an intervening
act as would relieve the government of liability. 0
N. Manufacturer's Liability
More than half a century ago MacPherson v. Buick Motor
C7o.81 established an exception to the general rule which required

privity before there could be a recovery against a manufacturer
for injuries sustained in using his products. In regard to remote
purchasers, MacPherson dispensed with the privity requirement
76. 247 S.C. 452, 456, 148 S.E2d 48, 49-50 (1966).
77. 249 F. Supp. 696 (D.S.C. 1966).
78. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2402 (1964).
79. § 422.5 provides:
Between a departing aircraft waiting take-off clearance and arriving
aircraft, sufficient separation, established by holding the departing aircraft short of the runway, so that: The arriving aircraft will not pass
over or in close proximity to the departing aircraft.
80. See Medlin v. United States, 244 F. Supp. 403 (W.D.S.C. 1965).

81. 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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and allowed recovery if the defective product, when put to use,
was imminently dangerous. This widely accepted rule was
recognized in South Carolina in the cases of Odom v. Ford
Motor 00.2 and Beasley v. Ford Motor 0.88
Over the years many jurisdictions have broadened MacPherso-n to allow recovery for injuries, within limitations, by persons
other than remote purchasers.8 4 Salladin v. Tellis 5 raised this
issue for the first time in South Carolina. The action was for
the wrongful death of the plaintiff's intestate who, as a workman, was electrocuted while installing light fixtures in defendant Telis' store. The complaint charged the defendant Universal Manufacturing Corporation, who had manufactured the
fixtures' electrical components, with negligence in furnishing
the defective parts to the fabricator knowing that they would
be installed in a building and could cause serious bodily harm.
Universal demurred to the complaint on the ground that there
was no privity between it and the decedent.. In affirming the
circuit court's order overruling the demurrer, the supreme court
said that the broadened rule "appears to be supported by sound
reason and the weight of modern authority" and "it is not
opposed by any prior decision of this court." As a legal basis
for overruling the demurrer, the court quoted from the Restatement of Torts:8 6
A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the
manufacture of a chattel which, unless carefully made, he
should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to those who use it for a purpose for
which the manufacturer should expect it to be used and to
those whom he should expect to be endangered by its probable use, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to
them by its lawful use in a manner and for a purpose for
7
which it is supplied.
0. Invitees
In Pleasant v. Mathias88 a demurrer had been overruled by
the circuit court in an action brought by the plaintiff for injuries
82.
83.
84.
85.

230
237
See
247

S.C. 320, 95 S.E.2d
S.C. 506, 117 S.E.2d
Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d
S.C. 267, 146 S.E.2d

601 (1956).
863 (1961).
1111 (1960).
875 (1966).
86. RESTATEMENT SECOND, ToRs § 395 (1965).
87. 247 S.C. 267, 271, 146 S.E.2d 875, 877 (1966).
88. 247 S.C. 124, 145 S.E.2d 680 (1965).
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received while repairing a glass door to the defendants' shop. On
appeal, the defendants sought to support their demurrer by
arguing that (1) the services were performed gratuitously, which
classified the plaintiff as an invitee to whom the duty of care
was discharged when warning was given of the door's condition,
and (2) the plaintiff had assumed the risk. The supreme court
stated that "while the question is a close one ...

for the purpose

of consideration of the demurrer, it cannot be said that the
plaintiff was merely an invitee. His sole purpose for going upon
the premises was to perform a service for the defendants at the
request of the defendants." Without actually deciding on the
existence of a master and servant relationship, the court reviewed the status of the relationship in regard to the question of
compensation:
Although it is unquestionably one of the indicia of a contract
of employment creating a master servant relation, the receipt
of a stated wage is not essential to create, nor does it necessarily establish the existence of, such a relation; the relationship may exist although the servant neither expects or is
entitled to any compensation. 9
Steinmeyer v. Marine HoteZ Corp.9° was distinguished from the
present case, and reversal of the circuit court on the defendants'
second argument was also refused. A demurrer will not ordinarily be sustained on the grounds of assumption of risk since
it is an affirmative defense and a question for the jury.
II. INDIGNITIES

A. MaZicious Proseution
By a 3-to-2 decision, the court in Parrott v. Plowden Motor
0o.91 held that the defendant had probable cause for prosecuting
the plaintiff, which under the general rule92 barred recovery in
89. Id. at 127, 145 S.E2d at 682 as quoted from 56 C.J.S. Master atd
Servant § 2e (1948). See also Tucker v. Buffalo Cotton Mills, 76 S.C. 539,
57 S.E. 626 (1907) ; Jackson v. Southern Ry., 73 S.C. 557, 54 S.E. 231 (1904).
90. 142 S.C. 358, 140 S.E. 695 (1927). In Steinineyer, a demurrer was
sustained on the grounds of assumption of risk as the only reasonable inference. The cases were found to be clearly distinguishable on their facts.

91. 246 S.C. 318, 143 S.E.2d 607 (1965).
92. To maintain an action for malicious prosecution, plaintiff must show
(1) the institution or continuation of original judicial proceedings,

either civil or criminal; (2) by, or at the instance of, the defendant;
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the action for malicious prosecution. Prior to the defendant's
action against him, the plaintiff had traded a truck to the defendant and had represented to him that the title was lost but
the truck was "paid for in full." A forthcoming duplicate title
from the highway department listed an unsatisfied mortgage
held by Floyd Motor Company who subsequently verified that
the plaintiff owed an outstanding balance. Denying any such
balance on several occasions, the plaintiff assured the defendant
that the matter would be taken care of. The defendant, advised
by a magistrate that he was entitled to a warrant, 93 subsequently
instituted the prosecution which terminated in the plaintiff's
favor. The majority stated that "the prosecutor is free from
94
damage if there be probable cause for the accusation made,"
and that:
By probable cause is meant the extent of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind
acting on the facts within the knowledge of the prosecutor
that the person charged was guilty of a crime for which he
has been charged ....

Or Although malice may be inferred

from want of probable cause, a want of probable
cause cannot
96
be inferred from any degree of malice.

The evidence revealed that the defendant suspected an existing
mixup between the plaintiff and Floyd Motor Company. In view
of this, the dissenting judges 97 felt that the defendant should
have reasonably concluded that the plaintiff, a man of honest
reputation, had not wilfully and knowingly breached any
statute.08 They would have reached a contrary result since:
(3)

termination of such proceeding in plaintiff's favor; (4) malice in

instituting such proceedings; (5) want of probable cause; and (6) resulting injury or damage.
Gibson v. Brown, 245 S.C. 547, 141 S.E.2d 653 (1965); Parrott v. Plowden
Motor Co., 246 S.C. 318, 321, 143 S.E2d 607, 608 (1965); accord, Prosser
v. Parsons, 245 S.C. 493, 141 S.E.2d 342 (1965).
93. S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-157 (1962) makes it a misdemeanor to sell or
dispose of any personal property on which any mortgage or other lien exists,
without the written consent of the mortgagee or lienee.
94. Parrott v. Plowden Motor Co., 246 S.C. 318, 322, 143 S.E2d 607, 609
(1965). See also Hogg v. Pinckney, 16 S.C. 387 (1880); Fulmer v. Harmon,
3 Strob. 576 (S.C. 1849); 6 S.C.L.Q. 375-76 (1954).
95. Ibid. See also Brown v. Bailey, 215 S.C. 175, 54 S.E2d 769 (1949).
96. Parrott v. Plowden Motor Co., 246 S.C. 318, 322, 143 S.E.2d 607, 609

(1965).

97. Id. at 323, 143 S.E.2d at 609 (dissenting opinion).
98. The dissent said it was inferable that plaintiff was charged with violation of S.C. CODE ANN. § 45-4 (1962) instead of § 45-157, supra note 93.
§ 45-4 provides:
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According to the generally accepted view, probable cause
does not depend on the actual state of the case in point of
fact, but upon the honest and reasonable belief of the party
commencing the prosecution. .

.

. The prosecutor must not

only actually believe in the guilt of the accused, but the
belief must also exist in the defendant's mind at the time of
the proceeding ... 99

The failure of a person who has received information tending to show the commission of a crime to make such further
inquiry or investigation as an ordinary prudent man would
have made in the same circumstances, before instituting a
proceeding, renders him liable for proceeding without probable cause. 00
The dissent found the facts warranted the possible inference that
the defendant simply became impatient with the plaintiff's disposition of the Floyd situation, and without resorting to any
readily available civil remedy, used prosecution to force the
matter.
B. Slander
The slander action in Davis v. Niederhof'01 was based on a
statement made by the plaintiff's former employer acting as head
of the South Carolina wood procurement division for the defendant West Virginia Pulp and Paper Company. Prior to the
action, the plaintiff had been employed as a manager of one of
the company's woodyards and had been charged with scaling
(measuring) the amount of wood received at the yard. He was
fired when his scaling figures began to reflect a large and unexplained variance with similar measurements made as the wood
was received at the company's plant. In a subsequent meeting of
all the company's woodyard managers, the defendant said: "We
are having trouble at Lake City. It looks like another Darlington
Any person who shall willfully and knowingly sell and convey any real
or personal property on which any lien exists without first giving notice
of such lien to the purchaser of such real or personal property shall be
deemed guilty of a misdemeanor....
99. Parrott v. Plowden Motor Co., 246 S.C. 318, 329, 143 S.E.2d 607, 612
(1965) (dissenting opinion) as quoted from 34 Am. JuR. Malicious Prosecution § 49 (1941).
100. Id. at 329, 143 S.E.2d at 612 quoting from 34 Amx. JuR. Malicious

Prosecution § 51 (1941).
101. 246 S.C. 192, 143 S.E.2d 367 (1965).
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situation, only there is a shortage of scale not inventory." Most
of the attendant employees knew of the Darlington shortage and
of the plaintiff's discharge from his Lake City job under suspicion. On the basis of this statement, they had concluded that the
plaintiff was dishonest. In answering the defendant's contention
that: (1) the statement was not slanderous, and (2) it was made
on a privileged occasion and in good faith, the court summarized' 0 2 the pertinent law:
It is well settled that a crime need not be charged eo nomine
for the words to be actionable ....1o It is only necessary
that the words should, of themselves, or by reference to
extraneous circumstances, be capable of the offensive meaning attributed to them. 10 4
[T]he alleged slanderous words used must be given their
ordinary popular meaning, and if they are susceptible of two
meanings, one slanderous and the other innocent, it must be
left to the jury to determine from all of the circumstances
attending the publication, in what sense the defendant used
them. 10 5 In such a case, the testimony of persons who heard
the words uttered as to the sense in which they understood
them is admissible ....
10o1 [T]he protection of a qualifiedly
privileged occasion extends only to a proper exercise of the
10 7
privilege.
Where the person exceeds his privilege and the communication complained of goes beyond what the occasion demands
that he should publish, and is unnecessarily defamatory of
plaintiff, he will not be protected. And the fact that a duty,
a common interest, or a confidential relation existed to a
limited degree, is not a defense, even though he acted in
10 8
good faith.
102. Davis v. Niederhof, 246 S.C. 192, 196-200, 143 S.E.2d 367, 369-71

(1965).
103. Porter v. News & Courier Co., 237 S.C. 102, 108, 115 S.E.2d 656,
658-59 (1960).
104. Williamson v. Askin & Marine Co., 138 S.C. 47, 53, 136 S.E. 21, 23
(1926).
105. Nettles v. MacMillan Petroleum Corp., 210 S.C. 200, 205, 42 S.E.2d

57, 59 (1947).
106. Davis v. Niederhof, 246 S.C. 192, 197, 143 S.E.2d 367, 369 (1965).

107. Id. at 199, 143 S.E.2d at 370-71.
108. Fulton v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 220 S.C. 287, 297, 67 S.E.2d 425,

429 (1951).

Published by Scholar Commons, 1967

19

1967]

South Carolina
Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1967], Art. 16
TORTSLaw
SURVEYED

In affirming a circuit court judgment in favor of the plaintiff;
the supreme court agreed that the question had been properly
submitted to the jury.
S. S. Kresge Co.1°9 that the order
The court held in Mason ,v.
refusing a motion which would have required plaintiff to allege
the verbatim words complained of in a slander action "deprived
the defendant of no substantial right and [was] . . .not appealable before final judgment."
C. Invasio4n of Privay
The alleged tort in Shorter v. Retail Credit Co.,110 which presented an issue of first impression to the South Carolina Supreme
Court, occurred when the defendant's agent ignored "keep out"
signs and went to the plaintiff's residence where he courteously
and politely asked Mrs. Shorter questions concerning her age,
her husband's occupation and salary, the number of children,
the age of the house and whether the house was insured against
fire and theft by the plaintiffs. The agent, who clearly identified himself as a representative of the defendant, received no
information concerning the husband's salary. Recovery was
sought on the basis that the defendant had no legitimate motive
for obtaining the information which was described by the
defendant as routine information for an insuring client. After
a review of the facts, the court found that the disclosure concerning insurance was the only basis on which recovery might
be possible under existing South Carolina law. It said, however,
that "neither the type of publicity nor the subject matter" was
a violation of the right of privacy defined in South Carolina as:
(1) the unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's
personality, or (2) the publicizing of one's private affairs with
which the public has no legitimate concern, or (3) the wrongful
intrusion into one's private activities, in such a manner as to
cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of
ordinary sensibilities."' In recognition that some jurisdic109. 247 S.C. 144, 146 S.E.2d 158 (1966).
110. 251 F. Supp. 329 (D.S.C. 1966).
111. Shorter v. Retail Credit Co., 251 F. Supp. 329 (D.S.C. 1966) ; accord,
Meetz v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956). Though not
considered in this situation, some writers would add "placing of plaintiff in a
false light in the public eye" as a fourth violation to the right of privacy.

See PRossER, ToRTs § 112 (3d ed. 1964).
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tions' 1 2 allow recovery as a "right to be left alone" the court
said:
When a plaintiff bases an action for invasion of privacy on
"intrusion" alone, bringing forth no evidence of publication
on the part of the defendant, it is incumbent upon him to
show a blatant and shocking disregard of his rights by the
defendant, and serious mental or physical injury or humiliation to himself resulting therefrom. As has been constantly pointed out, the conduct must outrage one of ordinary sensibilities and the hypersensitive person may not
recover for actions which are merely rude or inconsid11 3
erate.
Consequently, it held that although the plaintiffs were not "left
alone" in the most literal sense, the qualified right of privacy
which the law protects was not violated.
III. ComhmRcuL HARMS

A. Wrangfu (onversion
Rimer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.14 held in an action
for wrongful conversion that the devotion of personal time,
employment of counsel and other costs of litigation in pursuit
of such action, are not proper subjects on which a recovery may
be based. 115
As a parent case, Layton v. Flowers1 18 involved a default
judgment against Flowers, the former owner of the converted
automobile in Riner above, for his negligence in causing an
automobile collision. After the collision the Flowers' automobile
112. See, e.g., Pinkerton Nat'l Detective Agency v. Stevens, 108 Ga. App.
159, 132 S.E.2d 119 (1963); Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, Inc., 88 So. 2d

716 (La. App. 1956).
113. Shorter v. Retail Credit Co., 251 F. Supp. 329, 332 (D.S.C. 1966).
114. 248 S.C. 18, 148 S.E.2d 742 (1966).
115. The court stated:
Where the rights, or asserted rights, of parties are in conflict, it is
inevitable that each party desiring to protect his rights must give time
and attention to that end. To do so is not generally an element of damage, although it may be in some situations where loss of earnings is
involved, which is not the case here.
Nor do recoverage damages include the expense of employing counsel,
except when so provided by contract or statute, which is not the case
here.
Rimer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 248 S.C. 18, 27, 148 S.E.2d 742, 746

(1966).

116. 243 S.C. 421, 134 S.E.2d 247 (1964).
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was seized by a credit company and sold to a motor company
for its fair market value. Considerable repairs and improvements were made on the automobile which was eventually purchased from a dealer by Rimer and further improved. By this
time the value of the automobile exceeded the amount which
State Farm had paid to its insured Layton in satisfying the
Flowers' judgment, and it therefore sought to obtain a collision
lien 1 7 on it. Rimer intervened the plea of a bona fide purchaser
for value without notice but was overruled on the authority of
Tate v. Brazier"18 which held that an innocent third party purchaser without notice will not cut off this lien as established by
the legislature. Enforcement of the lien, however, was allowed
only to the extent of the fair market value of the automobile
before any repairs had been made.
B. Wrongful Discharge
In Burris v. Electro Motive Mfg. Co."19 the circuit court had
sustained a demurrer to the complaint on the grounds that:
(1) it failed to state a cause of action; (2) showed a defect in
plaintiff's parties; and (3) showed that under the Labor Management Relations Act,1 20 the National Labor Relations Board
preempted the court of its jurisdiction. The action was originally
brought pursuant to the South Carolina Right to Work Law,' 2 '
but on appeal the plaintiff argued that the defendant's false
accusation in regard to her union activity as set out in the
complaint would support a cause of action for slander. Finding
no allegation of the required publication, 122 the court held that
the complaint failed to state a cause of action for slander. It
stated that "since the holding of the circuit court to the effect
that the state court had no jurisdiction of the subject of the
action is unchallenged by any meritorious exception, that holding stands as law of the case, rendering it unnecessary for this
court to consider or decide the other questions raised and dis23
cussed on the appeal."
WsLEy L. BRowN
117.
118.
119.
120.

S.C.

CODE ANN. § 45-551 (1962).
115 S.C. 283, 105 S.E. 413 (1920).
247 S.C. 579, 148 S.E2d 687 (1966).
29 U.S.C. § 141 (1952).

121. S.C.

CODE ANN.

§§ 40-46 to -46.8 (1962).

122. See Riley v. Asldn & Marine Co., 134 S.C. 198, 132 S.E. 584 (1926).
123. 247 S.C. 579, 583, 148 S.E.2d 687, 688 (1966).
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